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Introduction 
OIL PRICES AND THE IRAQ WAR: 
MARKET INTERPRETATIONS OF 
MILITARY DEVELOPMENTS 
Robe rt E. Looney* 
By their nature, crises tend to have a negative impact on markets and economic 
activity. In a play on the old market adage, "buy on the rumor, sell on the 
fact," market wags now advise one to "sell on the saber-rattling, buy on the bul-
lets." Another variant suggests a wise movejs to "buy when you hear the sound of 
the cannon, sell when you hear the sound of the church bells." 1 While no doubt 
good advice in many cases, are these words of wisdom good guidance when it 
comes to oil markets during periods of war and conflict? 
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This paper examines oil price movements prior to and immediately following 
the initiation of the 2003 conflict in Iraq. Are the oil price movements during this 
period similar in nature to those previously observed in wartime situations? Are 
the markets reacting in a rational, predictable way to readily available information 
on military developments? 
Oil Markets during Crisis Periods: Conceptual Issues 
Identifying crisis/oil market links largely involve several steps. The first is the 
monitoring of factors that generally ar~ viewed by markets as affecting the out-
come of the conflict. In this regard, the research noted above focused on the 
deployment of forward-engaged naval forces. These are often the first to respond 
to a crisis, and their arrival on scene often can have a stabilizing political influence. 
The comings and goings of naval forces. are widely reported so that market traders 
can consider this information in planning their buy/sell strategies. 
Second, it is essential to select an index cap::i.ble of reflecting the market's inter-
pretation of the severity of a crisis as well as the degree to which market confidence 
is restored following a •military action. Because commodity markets are volatile 
and subject to destabilizing events such as conflict in the Arabian/Persian Gulf, 
producers and consumers frequently seek ways of hedging and trading risk. In 
response to this need, markets for commodity risk trading arose in the mid-1980s 
. and their use has become increasingly widespread. Instruments traded in these 
markets include futures and forward contracts, options, swaps, and other deriva-
tives. Futures contacts are among the most important of these instruments and 
provide important information about cash and storage markets. 2 
A futures contract is an agreement to deliver a specified quantity of a product at 
a specified future date, at a price (the futures price) to be paid at the time of deliv-
ery. Futures contracts usually are traded on organized exchanges such as the New 
York Mercantile Exchange (NYMEX) and, as a result, tend to be more liquid than 
forward contracts, which are not traded as widely. Other than this distinction, a 
futures contract differs from a forward contract only in that the futures contract is 
market-to-market, which means there is a settlement and corresponding transfer of 
funds at the end of each trading day. 
Although futures and forward contracts specify prices to be paid at the time of 
delivery, it is not necessary to take delivery. In fact, the vast majority of futures 
contracts are closed out or rolled over before the delivery date, so the commodity 
does not change hands because these contracts usually are held for hedging or 
speculation purposes-delivery of the commodity is not needed. For example, 
suppose that in January an industrial consumer of crude oil is worried about the 
risk of oil price increases during the coming year. That consumer might take a long 
futures position in crude oil by buying, say, an appropriat~ number of fully futures 
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contracts, but continue to buy oil on an ongoing basis from his usual source. If the 
price of oil rises between January and July, the consumer will pay more for his oil 
but will enjoy an offsetting gain from the futures position.3 
Because oil futures prices provide more information than spot prices, move-
ments in these markets were used to explore the effect of naval forward engagement 
and crisis response. Traders base their offers on the best economic, political, and 
military information available to them at the time the contract is traded. As a 
result, even though futures prices can be poor predictors4 of actual prices because 
of unanticipated events, they are considered by most as the best unbiased estimate 
of the likely spot or daily price of oil when the contracted delivery date actually 
arrives. Of course, this predicative ability of actual prices in the future falls off the 
longer the futures contract.5 
While the analysis below focuses on futures prices, it should be noted that in the 
short run retail prices do not follow precisely many of the patterns seen in these 
markets. In fact, a number of econometric studies confirm the casual observations 
that gasoline prices respond asymmetrically to crude-oil-price movements by ris-
ing more quickly when crude oil prices are increasing than falling when crude oil 
prices are decreasing.6 Although popular opinion seems to attribute the asymmetry 
to market power, S. Peltzman shows that price asymmetries arise independently of 
market structure.7 While interesting in themselves, these retail patterns do not alter 
the main conclusions derived below. 
In sum, futures markets transactions generate oil price forecasts that reflect trad-
ers' confidence as to the future state of oil markets. Thus, futures prices can be 
used to assess the effects of military actions, such as naval forward engagement 
and crisis response on market confidence in oil availability. 
Oil Price Movements during a Crisis 
With these considerations in mind, the actual oil price patterns observed in prior 
conflicts (the "first" Gulf War of 1990-1991, the Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1996, 
Operation Desert Strike of 1996, Operation Desert Fox of 1998, the Libyan Opera-
tions of 1986, the Gulf Shipping Crisis of 1987, and the Iraq-Kuwait border 
confrontation of October 1994) followed a fairly similar pattern. Prior to a crisis, 
oil futures-market curves generally slope upward as shown in figure 1, curve 1. 
Curve 1 reflects both the cost of storage and the general expectation among traders 
that oil prices will increase over time. With the advent of a crisis, however, future 
availability of oil is in doubt and traders attach an uncertainty or "war premium" to 
their asking price. 8 
The effect on futures prices is t\l{ofold. First, such a development increases 
futures prices for all months (indicated by an upward shift in the futures price 
schedule). Second, the slope of the futures market curve becomes negative (figure 
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Figure 1 
NOTIONAL RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN NAVAL CRISIS RESPONSE AND OIL 
FUTURES MARKETS 
(in dollars per barrel) 
Total naval crisis response effect 
(4) 
Crisis effect 
Months until Contracted Delivery Date 
(1) Pre-crisis futures price profile 
(2) Immediate post-crisis profile 
(3) Initial price profile following naval crisis response 
(4) Profile after markets equilibrate 
1, curve 2), reflecting traders' willingness to pay a premium for immediate posses-
sion of oil. It was found that when naval forces respond to the crisis, some of the 
uncertainty concerning oil supplies is alleviated. The impact of this information 
on trades shifts the futures price cµrve downward and decreases the short-run pre-
mium paid for immediate possessio~ of oil. These effects are evidenced by a 
downward shift and flattening of the futures price schedule (figure l, curve 3). 
Over time, naval forward presence reduces risk to oil supplies and alleviates 
traders' concerns over oil availability. Increasing confidence in oil supplies can be 
seen graphically by a further flattening of the futures price curve (figure 1, curve 4 ). 
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The 1990 Iraqi Invasion of Kuwait 
As noted, we found this model (with some case-by-case variation in detail) to 
depict oil price movements in a number of rece11t conflicts. In the case of Kuwait 
in 1990, following the August Iraqi invasion (a Thursday), oil spot prices increased 
to $28.30 by August 6 (the following Monday). 9 Traders at first did not know what 
to make of the invasion. But as events unfolded over the weekend, uncertainty 
heightened and futures markets shifted from upward sloping (figure 2, curve 1) to 
downward sloping (figure 2, curves 2, 3, and 4). As evidenced by the steep slope 
of the August 6 futures price profile (figure 2, curve 2), a high premium was placed 
on immediate possession of oil. Futures pr.ices increased again on August 7 before 
beginning to stabilize on August 8 as U.S. intentions became clear. Spot prices 
declined to $25.65 by August 8 as well. 
A close examination of movements in the sensitive NYMEX futures market 
shows that futures prices in fact had stabilized by around August 9. In general, as 
markets stabilize, the differential decreases between the price a trader offers for 
delivery of oil next month and the price offered for delivery of oil in two months. 
The differential between these two futures contracts is a very sensitive indicator of 
oil traders' uncertainty over oil availability. In this case, stabilization of the price 
differential (i.e., the first futures contract minus the second futures contract) indi-
cates that the full effects of naval crisis response had taken place, and a new 
equilibrium in oil markets had been established by August 9 (figure 3). (In figure 
4, a positive differential in the futures market reflects greater risk, i.e., a steeper 
downward slope in the futures price curve. Conversely, a negative differential 
reflects the elimination of a risk premium.) Specifically, the narrowing differential 
observed in this case reflects the reduced risk premium that sellers were able to 
charge for oil as concern over destruction of Saudi oil fields decreased. Put differ-
ently, because of the greater likelihood of continued Saudi oil availability, buyers 
were no longer willing to pay a high premium for delivery in the immediate future. 
Given the high oil inventories at the time, the fall in futures prices can be attrib-
uted only to the markets' confidence that the U.S. naval crisis response in the region 
would prevent any further encroachment by Iraq. While prices later began to drift 
up from this initial equilibrium, a close reading of the events of August 1990 sug-
gests that this subsequent increase was due mainly to factors other than U.S. forward 
engagement in the region. General market uncertainty over U.S. intentions regard-
ing Kuwait was heightened by Iraq's threat to attack Middle Eastern oil fields and 
the deliberate inaction of other members of the Organization of the Petroleum Ex-
porting Countries (OPEC) to increase output. 
Although subsequent movements in spot and futures prices occurred through-
out the fall of 1990 (figure 4 ), there are other explanations for these fluctuations-in 
essence, they were a war premium ·as markets assessed the risk to future supplies 
involved in removing Iraq from Kuwait. As figure 4 clearly shows, the war premium 
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Figure 2 
STABILIZATION OF NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE (NYMEX) MARKET 
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collapsed almost immediately once hostilities broke out on January 17, 1991. At 
that point, the markets appeared to be confident of the eventual outcome. 
In sum, oil prices were declining steadily (figure 5) throughout 1990 up to about 
a month before the invasion of Kuwait. ;I'his was a period of excess stocks, rather 
slack demand, and overcapacity among the major producers. There was little up-
ward pressure on prices until signs of Iraq's belligerence became more and more 
apparent in July. As noted earlier this was also a period of upward sloping futures 
-:--~·· 
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Figure 3 
STABILIZATION OF NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE (NYMEX) MARKET 
FOLLOWING NAVAL CRISIS RESPONSE TO 1990 IRAQI INVASION OF KUWAIT 
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curves, indicating no risk premium was associated with concerns over future avail-
abilities of oil. In other words, we safely can attribute most of the price increases 
from mid-July 1990 up to January 17, 1991, as strictly associated with military-
related events in Kuwait. In retrospect, it also is safe to say that the oil markets 
were good interpreters of military events as they pertained to future availabilities 
of oil. 
Pre-Iraq War Oil Scenarios 
As the 2003 Iraq War became more and more likely, there was increased specu-
lation as to possible oil price outcomes. Clearly, predicting what would happen to 
oil prices should the United States and its allies attack Iraq is not an exact science. 
As a result a wide range of outcomeS-have been suggested, depending on the length 
of the war, state (supply/demand balance) of oil markets at the time of the war, and 
---------
---- -------
-- - - --
--- --- --- --
--- - - --
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Figure 4 
NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE (NYMEX)/BRENT SPOT PRICES: 
JULY 1990-FEBRUARY 1991 
(in U.S. dollars per barrel) 
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the amount of damage to Gulf oil fields stemming from the war. 10 While there are 
too many of these scenarios to summarize here, they generally fall into one of three 
broad categories. 
Optimistic: A U.S.-led military campaign against Iraq starts before the end of 
March 2003 and is concluded successfully within two months, with fewer than 
1,000 casualties on the coalition side and without any heavy damage to Iraq's non-
military facilities. 11 Variants of this scenario usually assume President Saddam 
Hussein's government falls quickly, the Iraqi oil fields remain intact and the country's 
already dwindling oil exports of about 2 million barrels per day (bid) disappear for 
a few months, Venezuela's exports.:resume, and other countries led by Saudi Arabia 
boost production to make up any losses. Prices briefly spike to over $40 per barrel 
but within three months recede to normal levels or even lower with supplies plen-
tiful. This scenario appears to capture the Bush Administration's position toward 
the end of 2002. Although when presidential advisor Larry Lindsey noted that, 
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Figure 5 
NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE SPOT PRICE LEADING UP TO THE 
AUGUST 1990 INVASION OF KUWAIT 
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with Saddam gone, 3 million to 5 million b/d could be added to world supplies, 
thereby suggesting that war would be good for the economy, the White House 
retreated from the comment; Lindsey was replaced later. 
Highly Optimistic: Because he is a Nobel Prize winner writing in a respected 
and widely circulated magazine (Business Week), Gerry Becker'soil scenarios have 
received considerable attention. 12 Becker feels that an oil scenario will unfold 
similar to the one at the time of the first Gulf War: "world oil prices will probably 
rise further as war with Iraq appear to be more certain." 13 However, if the first few 
days indicate that Saddam will be decisively and quickly defeated, as he felt highly 
probable, then oil prices should fall sharply as the "war premium" disappears and 
uncertainty about world oil production diminishes. "Cutbacks in Middle East out-
put would be much smaller than during the Persian gulf war since Kuwait's facilities 
would not be destroyed, and Saddam has much less power to damage other facili-
ties than a decade ago." 14 
Worst Case: The basic version of this scenario assumes the invasion meets 
stiff resistance, Iraqi oil fields are set aflame, production is disrupted elsewhere in 
the Gulf, and global supplies fall by 6 million b/d. Although the International 
-- - -------~-- ---- _" ____________________ ----------~-----------------
--------- -- - --~ --------- ~---- ---- -
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Energy Agency maintains that its members have enough oil in storage to cover a 12 
million b/d disruption, this is only a temporary solution. Emergency stocks cannot 
close the gap over a protracted period. In such a case, oil prices could climb to $80 
a barrel and stay above $40 well into 2004, halting the U.S. economic recovery and 
triggering a global recession. G. Perry analyzed a similar "worse case" possibility 
and forecast with a potential loss of 7 million b/d, a tripling of crude prices, and $3-
per-gallon gasoline. 15 
No doubt, these alternative scenarios ~ere in the back of the minds of many oil 
traders as they watched events unfold in the days leading up to the conflict and the 
period immediately afterward. 
Oil Markets Prior to the War with Iraq 
The oil market environments at the time of the Gulf conflict of 1990-1991 and 
the Iraq War were sharply contrasted. Generally, very weak oil markets and falling 
prices characterized the six-month period leading up to the 1991 Gulf War. In 
marked contrast, oil markets in the months prior to the 2003 war with Iraq gener-
ally were strong. Prices in the six months prior to the March 19, 2003, start of the 
war went through three main phases (see figure 6). 
Falling Prices -Price/Inventory Paradox: The first phase, from October 1 
through mid-November, 2002, was one of generally falling prices, with the spot 
NYMEX price at its lowest ($25.36) on November 7. This particular price move-
ment is a bit puzzling given that inventories were quite low. In part, the fall in price 
reflects the fact that OPEC production in both September and October climbed to 
their highest levels of the year (2002). Many traders took this information to an-
ticipate increased supplies of crude oil entering the U.S. market in late November 
and December and, consequently, bet that oil prices would fall in the future. As a 
result, they sharply increased their net short positions by selling contracts then 
with the intention of balancing out their position later by buying contracts at lower 
prices in the future. This pattern is consistent with a falling NYMEX price during 
a period when U.S. crude inventories were near the lowest level in years. 16 In other 
words, looking at spot prices one might assume that inventories were adequate or 
on the high side when, in fact, the reverse was the case. 
Rising Prices-The War Premium: The second period was one of rising 
prices starting November 11, 2002; rising to $36.96 on February 27, 2003, and 
peaking at $37.87 on March 12. This period is reflective of the so called ,"war 
premium" that assumes an increasingly likely military conflict between the United 
States and Iraq could damage oil fields, pipelines, and export terminals in some 
Arabian Gulf states. 17 
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Figure 6 
NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE SPOT PRICE BEFORE AND AFTER THE 
START OF THE 2003 IRAQ WAR 
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Falling Prices-The Gulf War Syndrome: The final period, up to the begin-
ning of hostilities, was one of generally falling prices. Starting around March 13, 
2003, with the possibility of war with Iraq just days or even hours away, oil mar-
kets rode a wave of optimism as the anticipation of a quick war led many traders to 
go "short," expecting prices to fall following the onset of hostilities. Apparently, 
they felt that that uncertainty over the war with Iraq, the war premium, and the 
decrease in Venezuelan exports were the main reasons prices had risen to nearly 
$40 per barrel on March 12. 
At that time, many traders and some analysts expected that prices would fall 
well below $30 per barrel. Traders came to this conclusion mainly on the news that 
Venezuelan oil exports were rising. In addition, it reflected the growing feeling that 
the upcoming war with Iraq would play out along the lines of the highly optimistic 
scenario noted earlier-it would likely be short with little damage to the oil fields or 
terminals in the Gulf region. Combining these facts, traders assumed that the start 
of the conflict would set off a price drop of the magnitude experienced on January 
17, 1991, the start of the Gulf War. At that time ( 1991 ), the NYMEX crude futures 
plunged by one-third, or $10.56 a barrel, in the biggest single-day price drop ever. 
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The Financial Times had a less charitable view of these trading patterns as they 
extended into the first days of the conflict in 2003: 
Pollyanna would be proud of these hard-nosed speculators driving oil prices down as Iraqi 
oil wells bum. With spot prices down 25 percent in a week, they appear to believe that war 
in Iraq will be a swift affair. Futures prices suggest that when it is over the Organization of 
Petroleum Exporting Countries will shower the world w'ith crude and the price will fall out of 
its $22-$28 a barrel band late next year. 18 
Oil Markets after March 19, 2003 
With the beginning of hostilities, pric_es began falling, although nowhere on the 
scale of January 17, 1991. As news of the war was not as encouraging as many had 
anticipated, prices started to fluctuate, and by Friday, March 28, 2003, they were 
more or less back to the March 19 level. On March 28 the NYMEX May contract 
(figure 7) closed at $30.16 per barrel (versus $29.88 on March 19), while the Brent 
May contract (figure 8) closed at $26.35 per barrel (versus $26.75 on March 19). 
The difference in NYMEX and Brent prices largely reflect the very low stocks in 
the United States due to the Venezuelan strike-most Venezuelan oil is exported to 
the United States. · 
Of particular interest is the manner in which each market assessed changing risk 
to future positions. As noted earlier, a good proxy of the market's uncertainty over 
short-term future prices is given by the spread between the first and second for-
ward contracts. This declined rapidly up to March 20 but has been increasing 
gradually since, especially in the NYMEX market (figure 9). While it is too early 
to say if the slight decline in spreads on March 28 is indicative of a reduced percep-
tion of risk, it is clear that the markets increasingly were uncomfortable with many 
of the assumptions that had entered into their immediate post-war assessments of 
likely future prices. Martin Wolf provides a more critical interpretation: "Markets 
are cold-hearted beasts. As the bombs and missiles rained down, equity prices 
jumped and oil prices tumbled. But markets can also be stupid." 19 
Clearly, there was widespread disappointment that the highly optimistic oil sce-
nario noted above was not likely to play out in the strict sense. Nonetheless, even 
the relatively optimistic scenarios had predicted an oil spike to around $40 per 
barrel, and this did not occur. On the other hand, those who had stressed the market 
similarities with the first Gulf War were proven wrong. In this regard, there are a 
number of significant differences between the two periods and some new factors 
currently at play. 
Strategic Petroleum Reserve: First, in direct contrast to the decision on Janu-
ary 16, 1991, at the start of the Gulf War in 2003 President Bush decided not to 
release oil from the strategic petroleum reserve.20 This action implicitly trusts OPEC 
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Figure 7 
NEW YORK MERCANTILE EXCHANGE DAILY FUTURES PRICES BEFORE AND 
AFTER THE START OF THE 2003 IRAQ WAR 
(in U.S. dollars per barrel) 
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to cover the supply gap caused by the loss of around 2 million bid of Iraqi output. 
In the first Gulf War, the United States and its International Energy Agency part-
ners opted for a 2.5 million bid release from emergency stocks. 
Lack of OPEC Spare Capacity: Second, at the start of the Iraq conflict there 
were serious doubts about the real level of OPEC spare production capacity. One 
estimate asserted that OPEC (omitting Iraq and Venezuela) could only produce an 
increase of 1.1 million bld. 21 In contrast, OPEC's spare capacity in July 1990, 
before the Iraqis invaded Kuwait, was 5.2 million bid. While Venezuelan output 
gradually was coming back online after a crippling strike, it was anticipated that it 
would be some time before production and exports could reach their pre-strike 
levels. There also was vety limited non-OPEC spare capacity at this time. 
Nigerian Production Problems: Nigeria is the fifth largest source of U.S. 
crude oil imports. In 2002 the countty·accounted for about 6 percent of total U.S. 
imports of crude oil and about 3 percent of total U.S. consumption. Just before the 
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Figure 8 
BRENT DAILY FUTURES PRICES BEFORE AND AFTER THE START OF THE 2003 
IRAQ WAR 
(in U.S. dollars per barrel) 
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start of the Iraq War, an election-related dispute between the I jaw and Itsekiri tribes 
in the oil-producing West Niger Delta area began to escalate with the intervention 
of the Nigerian military. Violence has reached a point that the major companies, 
ChevronTexaco and Royal Dutch/Shell, undertook the unprecedented act of pull-
ing out staff and shutting down production.22 The result was a drop in Nigerian 
output of nearly 40 percent. 23 Additionally, elections were complicating the Nige-
rian government's attempts to resolve the strife. Perhaps because of this factor, the 
Ijaw were making political demands regarding voting boundaries that would be 
hard for the government to meet; thus, the conflict quickly resolved. 
Low Inventories: As noted,.inventories were extremely low. As of March 14, 
2003, commercial crude-oil stocks stood at approximately 270.2 million barrels. 
This figure was just above the minimum threshold at which the U.S. government 
warns shortages may occur. Crude stocks have never been this low at this time of 
year going back to 1982, when weekly figures were first recorded. Weak invento-
ries were on target to be the lowest at the end of March 2003 since 1974. 
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Figure 9 
OIL MARKET RISK PREMIUM: FIRST/SECOND FUTURES CONTRACT DIFFER-
ENCE, MARCH 17-MARCH 27, 2003 











~ ........ ... 
0.5 
o.o L---=:==::::::::::;::::::::::::::: 
March 17, March 19, March 21, March 23, March 25, March 27, 
2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 2003 
--Brent · · - · · New York Mercantile Exchange 
Conclusions 
Based on these patterns and developments in the early days of the Iraq War, 
several observations can be drawn concerning the markets' interpretation of mili-
tary developments. 
1. Military events did not appear to be driving the oil markets in 2003 to the 
extent they did in the first Gulf War. For one thing, low inventories and little 
surplus capacity for production mean that every event on the supply side will have 
a magnified effect on trader expectations24-the oil markets are very jittery.25 
2. The oil markets appear to have retained their acceptance of the essence of the 
highly optimistic scenario-otherwise prices would have been much higher. In 
addition, most traders, while appearing to react to hour-by-hour news breaks on the 
war,26 probably could not interpret this information in a way that provided insights 
to future market fundamentals-the failure to take Basra during the first week of 
the conflict was not good news, but how did this fact really impact on future oil 
markets? Even burning oil wells failed to halt the slide of oil prices in the early 
days of the war. 27 Much of this news probably just resulted in trades that canceled 
each other. 
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3. Because of a series of unresolved issues over the use of the Strategic Petro-
leum Reserve, developments in Nigeria (and perhaps Venezuela), low inventories, 
limited spare capacity in the oil-exporting countries, delays in getting Iraq produc-
tion back on line, and possible terrorist threats to facilities in the Gulf, one could 
anticipate that the markets would continue to be volatile,28 with the forward mar-
kets retaining their downward slope and with the steepness of the curves largely 
reflecting concern over supplies ip. the short term. 
4. In terms of the questions posed earlier, it seems the counter-intuitive rule of 
selling right before the start of a conflict and buying right after hostilities begin is 
the best strategy-at least based on the conflicts noted here. 
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